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According to Paul Boghossian, while a case can be made that the concept of 
mental content is normative, the claim that that of linguistic meaning is 
normative has no plausibility whatever1. Here I am not going to say any-
thing of interest about content. What I will try to do is explain why, unlike 
Boghossian, I am strongly inclined to say that meaning is normative2. 
Let us start with Boghossian’s argument (well, a more concise and more 
explicit counterpart of it): 
 
First premise: «An expression E expresses a normative notion only if it is constitu-
tive of our understanding of E that its application implies an ought or a may»3, and 
the fact that it is constitutive of our understanding of E that its application implies 
an ought or a may constitutes evidence for the conclusion that E expresses a nor-
mative notion. 
Second premise: it is a conceptual truth that belief «[…] should aim at the truth 
[…]»4, that one ought to try to believe only what is true (maybe belief should not 
                                               
1 Paul A. Boghossian, Is Meaning Normative?, in Christian Nimtz, Ansgar Beckermann, 
Philosophie und/als Wissenschaft – Hauptvorträge und Kolloquiumsbeiträge zu GAP.5, 
Paderborn, Mentis, 2005 and Paul A. Boghossian, The Normativity of Content, in Phi-
losophical Issues, vol. XIII, 2003, pp. 31-45. 
2 As far as I can see, the recent interest in the question that constitutes the title of the pre-
sent paper is a by-product of Kripke’s much-debated argument from normativity against 
dispositional analyses of meaning (for which see Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules 
and Private Language – An Elementary Exposition (1981), Oxford, Blackwell, 1982). 
Now, it is worth noting that what Kripke means by “normativity of meaning” is not ex-
actly what Boghossian means; the two senses are closely connected but nonetheless dis-
tinct. Therefore, I want to stress that what follows should not be seen as an attempt to ar-
gue for the premise of Kripke’s argument (I undertook such a task in my The Argument 
from Normativity against Dispositional Analyses of Meaning, in Volker A. Munz, Klaus 
Puhl, Joseph Wang, Language and World – Papers of the XXXII International Wittgen-
stein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2009). 
3 Is Meaning Normative?, cit., § 2, p. 208. 
4 Is Meaning Normative?, cit., § 2, p. 212, but see also John MacFarlane, Making Sense of 
Relative Truth, § II, p. 333, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. CV, 2005, pp. 
321-339. 
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aim only at the truth, maybe «[…] the point of belief is knowledge»5, but that belief 
should aim at least at the truth seems plausible). 
First lemma: it is constitutive of our understanding of “belief” that its application 
implies an ought6. 
Third premise: a case can be made that «[…] we understand the role that contents 
play in propositional attitudes generally only through our understanding of their 
role in belief»7. 
Second lemma: even if there are propositional attitudes (like desire) for which it is 
not the case that it is constitutive of our understanding of the corresponding expres-
sions that their application “directly” imply an ought, still one can try to maintain 
that it is constitutive of our understanding of “content” that its application somehow 
implies an ought8. 
Fourth premise: assertion is «[…] the verbal counterpart of judgment and judgment 
[…] the occurrent form of belief»9, but «[…] it is not a norm on assertion that it 
should aim at the truth, in the way in which it is a norm on belief that it do so»10 (if 
you mean addition by “+” and have a desire to tell the truth, then, if you are asked 
what the sum of 57 and 68 is, you ought to say: «125»; but what if you feel like ly-
ing or misleading your audience? All we have is a mere hypothetical ought11). 
Third lemma: it is not constitutive of our understanding of “assertion” that its ap-
plication implies an ought12. 
Fifth premise: if there is a speech act S such that we understand the role that mean-
ings play in speech acts generally only through our understanding of their role in S, 
S is assertion (as far as I can see, in Boghossian’s formulation, this premise is not 
made explicit). 
Fourth lemma: it is not constitutive of our understanding of “meaning” that its ap-
plication implies an ought13. 
Conclusion: while a case can be made that the concept of mental content is norma-
tive, the claim that that of linguistic meaning is normative has no plausibility what-
ever. 
 
Well, I have chosen to discuss Boghossian’s works for their merits and 
not for their deficiencies. However, there are a number of things that I find 
                                               
5 Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, New York-Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2000, Introduction, § 1, p. 1. 
6 See, e. g., Is Meaning Normative?, cit., § 2, p. 212. 
7 Is Meaning Normative?, cit., § 2, p. 213. 
8 Is Meaning Normative?, cit., § 2, pp. 212-217. 
9 Knowledge and Its Limits, cit., Introduction, § 4, p. 10. 
10 Is Meaning Normative?, cit., § 2, p. 212. 
11 Is Meaning Normative?, cit., § 2, p. 207. 
12 Is Meaning Normative?, cit., § 2, pp. 207-208. 
13 Is Meaning Normative?, cit., § 2, pp. 207-208. 
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questionable in this argument. The main one is the derivation of the third 
lemma from the fourth premise: Boghossian assumes that it can be constitu-
tive of our understanding of “assertion” that its application implies an ought 
only if it is a conceptual truth that assertion should aim at the truth; and this 
is incorrect. 
Consider John MacFarlane’s groundbreaking work on assessment sensi-
tivity. One of MacFarlane’s main aims is that of making sense of assess-
ment sensitivity, of showing that this notion is not incoherent. But why 
should one think that it is incoherent? MacFarlane writes: 
 
The charge of incoherence arises because a standard story about the significance of 
“true at a context of use CU” cannot be extended to “true at a context of use CU and 
context of assessment CA”. According to this story, truth is the internal aim of as-
sertion14. 
 
Now, according to MacFarlane, there is no prospect of generalizing this 
story not because the notion of assessment sensitivity is incoherent, but be-
cause truth can hardly be singled out as the aim of assertion: it is not even 
obvious that it is an aim of assertion15. This sounds like an endorsement of 
our fourth premise, but it is not: according to MacFarlane, saying that truth 
is an aim of assertion is saying that «[…] a false assertion is always incor-
rect qua assertion […]»16, and to cast doubt on such a thesis it is sufficient 
to stress that «An insincere assertion that happens to be true seems a more 
flagrant violation of the norms for assertion than a sincere […] one that 
happens to be false»17; according to Boghossian, saying that truth is an aim 
of assertion is saying that one ought to try to assert only what is true, and to 
disprove such a thesis it is sufficient to note that an insincere assertion is 
not necessarily a violation of the norms for assertion. Anyway, what matters 
most is that MacFarlane holds, on the one hand, that to make sense of as-
sessment sensitivity we also have to sketch a brand new story about the sig-
nificance of “true” and, on the other hand, that while the standard story fo-
cuses on the aims of assertion, our new story should focus on the conse-
                                               
14 John MacFarlane, The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions, § 5.2, p. 226, 
in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. I, 2005, pp. 197-233. 
15 Making Sense of Relative Truth, cit., § II, pp. 332-333. 
16 The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions, cit., § 5.2, p. 226. 
17 Making Sense of Relative Truth, cit., § II, p. 333 (my italics). 
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quences of making an assertion18. In particular, MacFarlane underlines that 
«An assertion […] is a commitment to the truth of the proposition as-
serted»19. 
But saying that I have committed myself to the truth of the proposition 
asserted is saying that I ought to withdraw my assertion when the proposi-
tion asserted is shown to be untrue, that I ought to be held responsible when 
someone else acts on my assertion, and maybe also that I ought to justify 
my assertion when it is appropriately challenged20 (I hope it is clear that 
these are in no sense hypothetical oughts: in the intended reading, “ought” 
has always outer scope). And this shows that it can be constitutive of our 
understanding of “assertion” that its application implies an ought even if it 
is not a conceptual truth that assertion should aim at the truth. 
Now, this is not exactly an argument for the normativity of meaning, but 
it almost is; and Robert Brandom (who is clearly one of the sources of in-
spiration for this part of MacFarlane’s work) explicitly argued that meaning 
is normative on the basis of remarks analogous to those just outlined21. 
However, I must confess that I am not entirely satisfied with this line of 
reasoning. In particular, I do not like the idea (which somehow unites 
MacFarlane and Brandom with Boghossian) that «The core case of saying 
something is […] asserting something»22. I will now sketch an argument 
for the normativity of meaning that makes use of both the notion of com-
mitment and aim but that does not assume either that it is a conceptual truth 
that assertion should aim at the truth or that there is a speech act S such that 
we understand the role that meanings play in speech acts generally only 
through our understanding of their role in S. 
My point of departure is that that of meaning is a “theoretical” concept 
whose aim is to explain communicative phenomena. From this, it follows 
that we can learn something of the very nature of meaning by reflecting on 
the structure of an explanation of a case of successful communication in 
terms of meaning. 
                                               
18 Making Sense of Relative Truth, cit., § II, p. 333. 
19 Making Sense of Relative Truth, cit., § II, p. 333. 
20 Making Sense of Relative Truth, cit., § II, p. 334. 
21 For a recent formulation see Robert B. Brandom, Between Saying and Doing: towards 
an Analytic Pragmatism, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 2, § 3, pp. 
41-43 and 4, § 4, pp. 111-114. 
22 Between Saying and Doing, cit., 2, § 3, pp. 41-42. 
Talk previously given at PhiLang2009, Uniwersytet Łódzki, May 15, 2009 
 5
Well, yesterday, at the Frederic Chopin Airport, I bought a sandwich; I 
pointed at the ham sandwiches and said to the waitress: «May I have one of 
those, please?», and she gave me a ham sandwich. My utterance reached its 
goal thanks to its meaning. More precisely (I use the traditional terminol-
ogy, even if I agree with Stefano Predelli when he maintains that it can be 
misleading23): in performing the utterance in question, I followed a rule; 
this rule is the character of the sentence I uttered; this character, together 
with the context of the utterance, yielded a content; the waitress knew 
which rule I followed and she was aware of the relevant features of the con-
text (for the sake of simplicity, you can conceive of my demonstration as 
one of these features) and therefore she grasped that content, she under-
stood what I meant. 
But how did she know which rule I followed? Well, she knew that con-
ventionally linked to that type of utterance there is a certain rule; she knew 
that I wanted to communicate and, hence, that I was trying to do what a 
speaker ought to do in order to communicate; finally, she knew that in or-
der to communicate speakers ought to follow the rules conventionally asso-
ciated with the types of which their utterances are occurrences24. 
And so, we found an ought. Insofar as I aim to communicate, I am com-
mitted to try to use words in a certain way (this is why Humpty Dumpty’s 
“theory of meaning” sounds absurd25). Is this “a mere hypothetical ought”? 
Of course, but not in Boghossian’s sense. When Boghossian says that the 
fact that if you mean addition by “+” and have a desire to tell the truth, then 
you ought to say: «125» when asked for “68 + 57” does not suffice to estab-
lish the normativity of assertion because this is a mere hypothetical ought, 
his point is that an insincere assertion is nevertheless an assertion26. But is a 
speech act that does not aim to communicate nevertheless a speech act? I 
think not. 
This is my argument for the normativity of meaning. Here is a more 
schematic formulation of it: 
                                               
23 See, e. g., Stefano Predelli, Contexts – Meaning, Truth, and the Use of Language, New 
York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. 
24 Of course, this is pretty rough. 
25 See Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There (1871), 
chapter VI, p. 213, in Lewis Carroll, The Annotated Alice – The Definitive Edition, New 
York-London, Norton & Company, 2000. 
26 Is Meaning Normative?, cit., § 2, p. 207. 
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First premise: the fact that it is constitutive of our understanding of an expression E 
that its application implies an ought constitutes evidence for the conclusion that E 
expresses a normative notion. 
Second premise: it is a conceptual truth that in order to perform a speech act one 
ought to try to use words in a certain way. 
First lemma: it is constitutive of our understanding of “speech act” that its applica-
tion implies an ought. 
Third premise: our understanding of the concept of meaning presupposes an under-
standing of the concept of speech act. 
Second lemma: it is constitutive of our understanding of “meaning” that its applica-
tion implies an ought. 
Conclusion: a strong case can be made that the concept of meaning is normative27. 
 
A final remark. In a short essay on “the metaphysics of words”, David 
Kaplan writes: 
 
[…] I think of my conception as being naturalistic, as owing more to the theory of 
evolution than to algebra28. 
 
Now, my final remark is that in this sense the argument I sketched is a natu-
ralistic argument. Of course, you can question such a use of “naturalistic”. 
But then you owe me a definition (or something like a definition) of “natu-
ralism”29. 
                                               
27 Therefore, Boghossian’s derivation of the third lemma from the fourth premise is un-
warranted simply because although the fact that I mean addition by “+” implies that I 
ought to say: «125» when asked for the sum of 57 and 68 only if I have a desire to tell the 
truth, there is a direct route from my meaning addition by “+” to the fact that I ought to 
try to use certain words in a certain way. During the discussion, Andrew Jorgensen 
pointed out that one can show that the derivation in question is unwarranted simply by 
noting that in order to lie, one ought to use words in a certain way: Boghossian found a 
case where (in a certain sense) it is not true that we should constrain the usage of words 
by their correctness conditions and wrongly concluded that in such a case there is no way 
we are supposed to use words (see Andrew Jorgensen, The Normativity of Meaning, 
manuscript, § 2, p. 7). I found Jorgensen’s argument appealing from the very beginning, 
and now I also know why: it is just a slightly different version of my argument; after all, 
in order to lie, one ought to use words in a certain way simply because lying is communi-
cating information believed to be false. 
28 David Kaplan, Words, I, § 1.6, note 9, p. 100, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soci-
ety, supp. vol. LXIV, 1990, pp. 93-119 (my italics). 
29 During the discussion, Jaroslav Peregrin noted that naturalists often define the notion of 
a naturalistic concept by saying that a concept is naturalistic if and only if it is one of the 
concepts of the natural sciences. Now, this is, no doubt, what naturalists usually say; but 
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this does not mean that such a definition is satisfactory (to be fair to Peregrin, he did not 
seem to be willing to maintain that it is). My main (but not sole) problem with this defini-
tion is that it somehow presupposes a monolithic conception of scientific research that, in 
my opinion, is nothing more than mythology and propaganda. 
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